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19861 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding, a higher standard of
review for the issuance of a warrant is not required.36 Finally, it is
suggested that the Supreme Court's reference to the Gates test
does not lend support to the majority's view that the Supreme
Court was reducing the required level of scrutiny in the warrant
process, or applying anything other than the established rule in
determining probable cause. '
Edwin G. Oswald
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 13-A: A district attorney may attach the personal assets of
a defendant, prior to conviction, without establishing that the at-
tached assets are the proceeds of a crime
Article 13-A of the CPLR was designed to "take the profit out
of crime."' The article provides for a civil forfeiture action2 by a
36 See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 491 (1973). In Heller, the Supreme Court held
that the film in question was not subject to a prior restraint, as there was no threat of
destruction, and the warrant was issued by a neutral magistrate; therefore, the seizure as
evidence was permissible. See id. at 492. It is suggested that, although P.J. Video is not a
prior restraint case, the Court of Appeals has improperly applied the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis for prior restraint cases to it.
37 See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 106 S. Ct. at 1615 n.6. The Gates test is in fact not
applicable to P.J. Video where no informant is involved, inasmuch as such an informant is a
necessary factor in the Gates analysis. See P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 318-19, 501 N.E.2d
at 571, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
1 Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 669, N.Y. Laws (Aug. 1, 1984), reprinted
in [1984] N.Y. Laws 3627 (McKinney). On approving article 13-A, Governor Cuomo stressed
the importance of the bill as a weapon "against illicit drug trafficking, and other forms of
organized crime." Id. at 3628. Article 13-A, which took effect August 1, 1984, repealed and
replaced the prior article 13-A, which had been enacted the preceeding year. See CPLR
1310-52 (McKinney Supp. 1987). The new article contains more detailed provisions on bur-
den of proof, presumptions, and the claims of third parties to property associated with the
commission of a crime. See Girese, Forfeiture: A New, Comprehensive Legislative Tool in
War Against Crime, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 25, 1985, at 17, col. 1, col. 2.
2 See CPLR 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987). This section provides that "[a]ny action
under this article.., shall be civil, remedial and in personam in nature and shall not be
deemed a penalty or criminal forfeiture for any purpose." Id. By labeling the action "civil,"
the Legislature has made available other elements of the CPLR, such as provisional reme-
dies, which may be unavailable in a criminal prosecution. See CPLR 1350 (McKinney Supp.
1987).
A forfeiture action which is interpreted as criminal may run afoul of the double jeop-
ardy clause. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; see also Note, A Definition of Punishment for Im-
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prosecutor, as "claiming authority,"' against anyone possessing the
proceeds, substituted proceeds or instrumentality of a crime.4 The
claiming authority is also empowered to seek a money judgment
against a criminal defendant in an amount equivalent in value to
such crime-related assets.5 Conviction of a felony is generally a
plementing the Double Jeopardy Clause's Multiple-Punishment Prohibition, 90 YALE L.J.
632, 633 (1981) (action which results in imprisonment or fine is punishment for crime). The
power of the Legislature to provide for forfeiture proceedings is subject to judicial review.
See Short Stop Indus. Catering Corp. v. City of New York, 127 Misc. 2d. 363, 367, 485
N.Y.S.2d 921, 925 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1985) (citing 44 N.Y. JUR. Forfeitures § 32, at
229 (1965)). When the Legislature imposes a forfeiture that is punitive rather than remedial,
courts sometimes interpret the proceeding as criminal, regardless of a "civil" designation.
See, e.g., Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1921) (double tax on manufacture and sale
of illegal beverages constitutes penalty).
I See CPLR 1310(11) (McKinney Supp. 1987). "Claiming authority" means the district
attorney or attorney general having criminal jurisdiction or "the appropriate corporation
counsel or county attorney . with the consent of the district attorney or the attorney
general, as appropriate." Id.
' See CPLR 1310(2), (3), (4); 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987). A forfeiture action may
be commenced against a criminal defendant, "a person who has criminal liability for a [fel-
ony]," CPLR 1310(9) (McKinney Supp. 1987); or a non-criminal defendant, "a person, other
than a criminal defendant, who possesses an interest in the proceeds ... substituted pro-
ceeds ... or an instrumentality of a crime." CPLR 1311(10) (McKinney Supp. 1987); see
CPLR 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
The practice of imposing forfeiture of estate on convicted felons, though part of the
English common law, was never adopted into the American common law. See Hughes &
O'Connell, In Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion
of a Harsh English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 613, 614
(1984). Forfeiture of estate is prohibited by the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 3. However, the Confiscation Act of 1862 authorized the President to seize the life
estates of confederate soldiers, see Confiscation Act, ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589 (1862); and
the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime have always been subject to forfeiture. See Fin-
kelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Prospectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful
Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEmP. L.Q. 169, 249-55 (1973).
In 1970, Congress passed two pieces of legislation authorizing forfeiture of assets not
directly connected to the underlying crime: Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1984); and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise portion of the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970 ("CCE"), 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1981), which authorized in personam
forfeiture for persons convicted of continuing criminal enterprises. Although there has been
much debate as to the constitutionality of these statutes, see Tarlow, RICO: The New Dar-
ling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 165, 292-95 (1980); Note, Due Process
in Preliminary Proceedings under RICO and CCE, 83 COLUM L. REv. 2068, 2069 (1983),
they have consistently been upheld by the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Grande, 620
F.2d 1026, 1037-38 (4th Cir. 1980) (RICO action does not revive proscribed "forfeiture of
estate").
' See CPLR 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987). "Criminal defendant" includes a defend-
ant who has been convicted of any felony under New York law, or one whom "the claiming
authority proves by clear and convincing evidence... has committed an act in violation of
article two hundred twenty or section 221.30 or 221.55 of the penal law." CPLR 1310(9); see
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condition precedent to forfeiture of assets not directly related to
the crime.' Recently, however, in Morgenthau v. Citisource, Inc.,7
the Court of Appeals held that a defendant under indictment,
though not convicted, may be treated as a criminal defendant for
purposes of commencing a forfeiture action, thereby enabling a
claiming authority to attach unrelated personal assets pending res-
olution of the criminal action.8
In Citisource, defendants Marvin Kaplan, Stanley Friedman
and others, had been indicted for, but not yet convicted of, com-
mitting various crimes in connection with a 22.7 million dollar con-
tract awarded by the City of New York to Citisource for the devel-
opment of a computerized parking violations summons issuance
system.9 Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau brought
a civil forfeiture action to recover 4.49 million dollars, allegedly ob-
tained through the commission of those crimes.10 District Attorney
Morgenthau obtained an ex parte order attaching approximately
CPLR 1310(6) (McKinney Supp. 1987). The sections of the penal law cited cover drug traf-
ficking felonies, a particular target of the act. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 221.30, 221.55; supra
note 1.
6 See CPLR 1311(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1987). "A court may not grant forfeiture until
.. conviction has occurred." Id. Prior conviction is not a prerequisite, however, where a
pre-conviction forfeiture crime is at issue. See CPLR 1311(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1987). If
a defendant is charged with a "pre-conviction forfeiture crime," he is subject to forfeiture
absent conviction, provided that the claiming authority proves, by clear and convincing evi-
"dence, that the defendant committed the underlying crime. See id.
An action for the provisional remedies of attachment, injunction, receivership, and no-
tice of pendency available under article 13-A, see CPLR 1312(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987),
may be commenced, and a court "may grant a provisional remedy provided under this arti-
cle, prior to ... conviction." CPLR 1311(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
7 68 N.Y.2d 211, 500 N.E.2d 850, 508 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1986).
8 See id. at 219, 500 N.E.2d at 853, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
9 See Morgenthau v. Citisource, Inc., N.Y.L.J., May 5, 1986, at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Spec.
T. 1986). Friedman was "special counsel" to Citisource; the remaining individual defendants
were officers, directors, and majority shareholders. Id. It was alleged that Friedman had
been paid $21,000 in attorney's fees, and that Kaplan had been paid $8000 by Citisource. Id.
at col. 4. Both the criminal indictment and the complaint in the forfeiture proceeding
claimed that Friedman was issued shares of stock, which he held for his own benefit, and
which were to be used to bribe Geoffrey G. Lindenauer, of the New York Parking Violations
Bureau, and Donald R. Manes, Queens Borough President, for their efforts in procuring the
contract. Id. at col. 3. Through false representations about the corporation, the defendants
allegedly sold 736,000 shares of Citisource stock to the public at five dollars per share. Id. As
a result, defendants were indicted for violating the Donnelly Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340
et seq. (McKinney 1976), and the Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352-c(2), (5), (6) (Mc-
Kinney 1976), covering antitrust and securities fraud respectively. See People v. Kaplan,
Indictment No. 1913/86, filed by a N.Y. County grand jury, March 27, 1986. The 27 count
indictment also alleged grand larceny, bribery, bribe receiving, and conspiracy. Id.
10 See Citisource, 68 N.Y.2d at 215, 500 N.E.2d at 851, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
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two million dollars in personal assets of Kaplan and Friedman, and
a temporary order restraining the alienation of $400,000 in an al-
leged ERISA trust, of which Kaplan was a beneficiary and sole
trustee.11 No attempt was made to connect these assets to the pro-
ceeds, substituted proceeds or instrumentality of the crime. 12
The defendants opposed Morgenthau's motion to confirm the
orders of attachment, claiming, inter alia, that they were non-
criminal defendants, since they had not been convicted, and that
the District Attorney was therefore limited to attaching assets re-
lated to the crime. 3 Special Term denied the defendants' motion
to vacate, confirmed the attachments, and issued a preliminary in-
junction against transfer of the trust assets.14
The Appellate Division, with one justice dissenting, vacated
the orders, holding that the defendants were not criminal defend-
ants as defined in CPLR 1310(9), since they had not been con-
victed.1 5 Rather, the court held, they must be treated as non-crimi-
nal defendants, potentially liable only for the proceeds, substituted
proceeds or instrumentality of the crime.1 6 The case was presented
" Id. The orders authorized the attachment of $1,430,000 belonging to Kaplan and
$615,000 belonging to Friedman. Id. The trust fund involved was the Desu Consulting and
Leasing Co. Retirement Trust account. Id.
In addition to the personal assets of the defendants, the attachment of $5,118,000 was
authorized against Citisource; the corporation being named, alternatively, as a "non-crimi-
nal defendant," CPLR 1310(10) (McKinney Supp. 1987), and as the "instrumentality of the
crime," CPLR 1310(4) (McKinney Supp. 1987). Citisource, 68 N.Y.2d at 215 n.2, 500 N.E.2d
at 851 n.2, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 153 n.2. This attachment was not challenged on appeal. Id.
1 See Citisource, 68 N.Y.2d at 214, 500 N.E.2d at 850, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
1" See id. at 215-16, 500 N.E.2d at 851-52, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 153-54. The defendants also
maintained that the statute, as interpreted, was unconstitutional because it violated proce-
dural due process and deprived them of their right to counsel. Id. at 220, 500 N.E.2d at 854,
508 N.Y.S.2d at 156. Further, they contended that District Attorney Morgenthau had not
sustained his statutory burden of showing that attachment was necessary or proper in the
action. Id. at 216, 500 N.E.2d at 851, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 153. Finally, Kaplan claimed that the
Desu trust was immune from alienation under federal law. Id.
4 See Citisource, N.Y.L.J., May 5, 1986, at 13, col. 6. Special Term allowed transfer of
the assets of the Desu trust into "like short-term federal obligations." Id.
'5 See Morgenthau v. Citisource, Inc., 121 App. Div. 2d 353, 353, 504 N.Y.S.2d 108, 110
(1st Dep't 1986); see also supra note 5 (definition of criminal defendant).
1" See Citisource, 121 App. Div. 2d at 354, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 110. The court reasoned
that, since the attachments were characterized as necessary to satisfy a money judgment
equivalent to proceeds, substituted proceeds or instrumentality of the crime, they would be
unrecoverable, and therefore unattachable, absent a prior conviction. See id. at 353-54, 504
N.Y.S.2d at 110; CPLR 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987). The Appellate Division declared
Kaplan's claim, that the Desu trust was immune from alienation, a moot point since it had
not been shown that the trust was related to the crime. See id. at 354, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
The First Department did not reach any of the other issues determined at Special
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to the Court of Appeals on the certified question: "Was the order
of this court, which modified the order of the Supreme Court,
properly made?'117
Answering the certified question in the negative, the Court of
Appeals reversed the Appellate Division."8 Judge Alexander, writ-
ing for a unanimous court, found that the Appellate Division had
erred in its classification of Friedman and Kaplan as non-criminal
defendants.19 The court indicated that the pending indictment
made Friedman and Kaplan "putative" criminal defendants.20
Judge Alexander noted that the statute explicitly authorizes the
commencement of an action prior to conviction, and the use of
provisional remedies therein.21 He asserted that it would be illogi-
cal and contrary to legislative purpose to allow the forfeiture ac-
tion to begin without providing the power to secure the continued
availability of assets needed to satisfy a potential judgment.22 Fi-
nally, the court determined that on its face the statute violates
neither procedural due process,23 nor the right to counsel. 4 The
Term, but remanded the case for a hearing to determine if any proceeds or substituted
proceeds were chargeable to Friedman or Kaplan. See id. at 354, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 110. Jus-
tice Sandler wrote a forceful dissent praising Justice Stecher's opinion at Special Term,
employing much the same rationale later relied upon by the Court of Appeals. See id. at
354-58, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 110-12. (Sandier, J., dissenting).
17 Citisource, 68 N.Y.2d at 214, 500 N.E.2d at 851, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
18 See id. at 215, 500 N.E.2d at 851, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
" See id. at 219, 500 N.E.2d at 853, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
20 See id.
21 See id. at 219-20, 500 N.E.2d at 854, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (citing CPLR 1311(1)(a),
1312(1)).
22 See Citisource, 68 N.Y.2d at 220, 500 N.E.2d at 854, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
2S See id. The court considered the relevant factors enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976):
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural require-
ments would entail.
Id. at 334-35; Citisource, 68 N.Y.2d at 221, 500 N.E.2d at 855, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
The Court of Appeals found that the instant use of government enforced forfeiture pro-
cedures involved a protected property or liberty interest, see Citisource, 68 N.Y.2d at 220,
500 N.E.2d at 854, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 156, but determined that the statute contained sufficient
safeguards to protect the defendant and additional safeguards were unnecessary. See id. at
223, 500 N.E.2d at 856, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 158. Judge Alexander also cited a significant gov-
ernment interest "in deterring criminal conduct [and] ... preserving the assets for use in
compensating the victims." Id. at 221, 500 N.E.2d at 855, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 157. Therefore,
the court held, the statute does not violate due process. See id. at 223, 500 N.E.2d at 856,
508 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
21 See id. at 223, 500 N.E.2d at 856, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 158. The court stated that, al-
though a problem in regard to the right to counsel could arise, the statute addresses this
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case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider whether
the District Attorney had sustained his statutory burden of
proof. 25
The structure of article 13-A is quite complex. In Citisource,
the Court of Appeals has promulgated a construction of the statute
which is consistent with statutory purpose26 and gives clear guid-
ance to the lower courts.2 7 It is submitted, however, that the at-
tachment of personal assets, not traceable to the crime, should be
permitted only where proceeds, substituted proceeds or the instru-
mentality of the crime are either unavailable, or likely to become
so. 21 Article 13-A was formulated to serve the remedial purposes of
problem "by expressly requiring the claiming authority to prove that the need for the [at-
tachment] outweighs the hardship on the [defendant]." Id.; see CPLR 1312(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1987). Further, under section 1329, the defendant can move to vacate or modify, and
under section 1311(4)(d)(1), the court may dismiss sua sponte in the interest of justice.
Citisource, 68 N.Y.2d at 223, 500 N.E.2d at 856, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
" See id. at 223-24, 500 N.E.2d at 856, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 158. In order to obtain a provi-
sional remedy the claiming authority must establish that there is a substantial probability of
obtaining a conviction; that failure to grant the provisional remedy will result in the pro-
ceeds becoming unavailable for forfeiture; and that the need to preserve the status quo out-
weighs the hardship on the defendants. Id.; see CPLR 1312(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
Though some dissatisfaction had been expressed at Special Term with the "largely con-
clusory" nature of the papers on which attachment was granted, Justice Stecher accepted
the proof offered by District Attorney Morgenthau on these points. See Citisource, N.Y.L.J.,
May 5, 1986, at 13, cols. 3-6. Since the Appellate Division had vacated based on an errone-
ous reading of the statute, they did not address the adequacy of District Attorney Morgen-
thau's proof. See Citisource, 68 N.Y.2d at 223-24, 500 N.E.2d at 856-57, 508 N.Y.S.2d at
158-59.
For some examples of the manner in which courts apply the proof requirements of sec-
tion 1312(3) see District Attorney of Queens County v. McAuliffe, 129 Misc. 2d 416, 493
N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1985) (attachment of real property); Holtzman v.
Samuel, 130 Misc. 2d 976, 495 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1985) (attachment of
bank accounts); Dillon v. Neira, 130 Misc. 2d 434, 495 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Nassau County Ct.
1985) (attachment of proceeds of cocaine sale).
2 Cf. supra note 4 (statutory distinction between "criminal defendant" and "non-crim-
inal defendant"). It is submitted that the "non-criminal defendant" provision in the statute
was intended to apply to third parties, to whom a potential criminal defendant might trans-
fer his assets in an attempt to avoid forfeiture. "Because criminal defendants might attempt
to avoid the harsh consequences of forfeiture by disposing of their assets, an... action may
be brought against any person who has an interest in the property subject to forfeiture." 2A
WK&M 1 1310.03, at 13-A-9 (1984).
2" At least one court had found the Appellate Division holding in Citisource problem-
atic and had applied it reluctantly. See Kuriansky v. Natural Mold Shoe Corp., 133 Misc. 2d
489, 496, 506 N.Y.S.2d 940, 946 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1986).
28 In addition, the claiming authority may not recover an amount greater than the
value of the substituted proceeds and instrumentality of the crime. See CPLR 1311(8) (Mc-
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restitution and deterrence, not to provide a means of harassing de-
fendants where recovery may be achieved without resort to per-
sonal assets.2" It is urged, therefore, that the recoverability of the
actual or substituted proceeds of the crime be explicitly considered
in any motion for attachment of a defendant's unrelated personal
assets.30
In Citisource, the court authorized the attachment of corpo-
rate assets in an amount greater than the judgment sought.31 How-
ever, in light of the uncertainty expressed at Special Term as to
the continued availability of corporate assets to satisfy a potential
judgment, 32 it is submitted that attachment of the defendants' per-
sonal assets was appropriate. 3
The legislature, in creating article 13-A, gave prosecutors a
powerful tool, designed to have a disabling effect on criminal activ-
ity. The Citisource decision strengthens that tool by making it in-
creasingly difficult for defendants to shelter assets from forfeiture.
The courts, however, should not allow prosecutors to use pre-con-
viction attachment as a tool to harass defendants.
James F. Kelly
Kinney Supp. 1987).
20 See Dillon v. Neira, 130 Misc. 2d 434, 439, 495 N.Y.S.2d 622, 626.
20 See CPLR 1312(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987). The claiming authority must demon-
strate the necessity of obtaining the provisional remedy, and that such necessity outweighs
any hardship imposed on the defedants. See id. It is submitted that neither of these re-
quirements is satisfied where the actual proceeds, substituted proceeds or instrumentality of
the crime are easily recoverable.
31 See Citisource, 68 N.Y.2d at 215 n.2, 500 N.E.2d at 851 n.2, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 153 n.2.
District Attorney Morgenthau sought $4.49 million; an attachment of $5,118,000 was author-
ized against Citisource. Id.
2 See Citisource, N.Y.L.J., May 5, 1986, at 13, col. 6. Out of the $4.49 million alleged to
have been wrongfully garnered by Citisource, $3 million had already been disposed by the
time attachment was authorized. Id. The corporate bank account containing $95,759.34 and
$700,000 worth of Treasury Bills were actually attached. Id.
33 The litigation developing out of the basic factual setting of Citisource has continued.
On November 25, 1986, Kaplan and Friedman, along with Lester N. Shafran and Michael J.
Lazar, were convicted in a RICO action of racketeering, conspiracy, and mail fraud in the
Federal District Court in New Haven (Whitman Knapp, J., presiding). See N.Y. Times,
Nov. 26, 1986, at Al, col. 1. The state criminal action underlying the article 13-A forfeiture
proceeding has been postponed pending the outcome of the federal action. Id.
